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ute's consideration exception,
N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 9-103(2)(b)
(McKinney 1988). Under the consideration exception, if Biomass
gave Larini permission to ride a
snowmobile along the access road
in exchange for some form of consideration, Biomass would be liable to Larini for his injuries. The
Larinis urged the court to accept an
"indirect consideration" theory as
a basis for applying the exception.
Under such a theory, the Larinis
argued that since Larini was a
potential purchaser of a lot in the
subdivision, Biomass anticipated
receiving consideration from him.
The court refused to apply the
consideration exception to the Larinis, noting that no New York
court had ever found any form of
indirect consideration sufficient to
satisfy the exception. In addition
to consideration, the exception expressly required the injured party
to demonstrate that he had permission to use the landowner's recreational property. Larini admitted
that he did not have express or
even implied permission to enter
the property without a real estate
agent or a Biomass representative
or to ride a snowmobile on the
property. Therefore, the court noted that even if it adopted the
"indirect consideration" theory,
the Larinis' argument would fail.
Willful Or Malicious Conduct Exception
The Larinis then alleged that
Biomass was liable under the willful or malicious conduct exception,
N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 9-103(2)(a)
(McKinney 1988), due to its failure
to erect guardrails and warnings
around the drop-off leading to the
drainage ditch and stream bed.
The exception imposed liability
upon the landowner for willful or
malicious failure to guard or warn
against a dangerous condition. The
court rejected this argument as
well. The Larinis failed to prove
that Biomass intentionally and unreasonably failed to issue warnings
regarding an obvious risk. The
court noted that the road on which
Larini travelled posed no danger to
those who used it for its usual and
ordinary purpose; Biomass could
not reasonably be required to mark
off-road obstacles.
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Common Law Liability
Finally, the Larinis argued that
the common law liability of a landlord applied in this case. The Larinis argued that Biomass was liable
under the reasonable care standard
because Biomass could have reasonably expected the public to enter the property and to sustain
injury because of the nature of the
hidden drop-off.
The court rejected the Larinis'
application of the common law
duty of reasonable care. The court
noted that in situations covered by
the recreational use statute, the
statute's standard of willful or malicious conduct constituted the single standard applicable.
Finding no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the Larinis' claim, the court affirmed the
district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Biomass.
Rosemary G. Milew

Evidence of Side
Agreement Between
Lender and Borrower
Not Admissible To Show
Modification of Loan
Agreement
In Hall v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 920 F.2d 334 (6th Cir.
1990), the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the D'Oench
doctrine barred an action by a
borrower against a failed savings
and loan association for breach of a
loan agreement. The D'Oench doctrine protected the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (the
"FDIC") by excluding evidence of
secret agreements modifying loan
agreements made between the
failed lending institution and its
former customers.
Background
R. Vance Burkey and M.D.
Kelly ("Burkey and Kelly") owned
B & K Enterprises, Inc. ("B & K"),
a corporation which constructed a
motel in Knoxville, Tennessee. In
order to finance the motel's construction, Burkey and Kelly obtained a $1,000,000 loan from
United American Bank of Knox-

ville ("UAB"); UAB took a first
priority lien in the motel units. B &
K subsequently defaulted on the
UAB loan and advertised the units
for sale. Lillian H. Hall and William L. Hall ("the Halls") and
Brenda C. Gibson and Wallace G.
Gibson ("the Gibsons") answered
the advertisement. Burkey and
Kelly, the Halls, and the Gibsons
formed the Jackson, Tennessee
Motel Partnership ("the partnership") and agreed to obtain another loan to pay off the UAB debt and
move the motel to Jackson, Tennessee.
In January 1983, the Halls and
the Gibsons entered into a loan
agreement with Commerce Federal
Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
("Commerce") which provided
that Commerce would lend them
$1.85 million in exchange for a
first priority security interest in the
motel units. Burkey and Kelly
served as guarantors on the loan.
The partnership allegedly believed UAB would also be involved
in the new loan with Commerce.
Commerce and UAB had agreed
that UAB would participate in the
Commerce loan, a fact confirmed
in a letter signed by the two lenders. However, the two lenders had
not entered a formal participation
agreement at the time the partnership closed the loan with Commerce. The loan agreement between the partnership and
Commerce stated that Commerce
would not be obligated to fund
more than $750,000 if UAB failed
to participate in the loan agreement. At the closing with Commerce, the partnership signed a
security agreement which gave
Commerce a security interest in all
personal property and gave Commerce an interest in the motel land
through execution of a deed of
trust in favor of Commerce. Commerce then disbursed $200,000.00
to the partnership as a first draw on
the loan.
In February 1983, Commerce
refused to fund the loan further
because the partnership had failed
to give Commerce a first priority
lien on the units, in accordance
with the loan agreement. The partnership stopped construction on
the motel. Unpaid subcontractors
(continued on page 102)
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sued the partnership and obtained
liens on the motel property.
Shortly thereafter, the Commissioner of Banking for the State of
Tennessee closed UAB. The FDIC
was appointed as the receiver.
UAB retained its first priority security interest in the units until
September 1985, when the FDIC
subordinated the UAB security interest to Jackson National Bank
("Jackson"). In'October 1985, the
partnership obtained a loan from
Jackson to complete the motel and
to pay outstanding debts, including
the balance owed to Commerce. In
August 1986, Commerce was also
placed in receivership.
In April 1987, the partnership
sued Commerce for breach of the
loan agreement. The partnership
claimed that Commerce failed to
fund fully the $1.85 million loan.
In August 1988, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (the "FSLIC") became the
receiver for Commerce. Security
Trust Federal Savings and Loan
Association ("Security Trust") acquired most of Commerce's assets
and liabilities from the FSLIC. The
assignment agreement, signed in
conjunction with the acquisition
agreement, expressly stated that
the FSLIC, and not Security Trust,
would assume any liability resulting from the partnership's lawsuit.
District Court Proceedings
The district court granted Security Trust's motion to dismiss it as
a party because the assignment
expressly exempted Security Trust
from any liability in the partnership's lawsuit. The court concluded that FSLIC was the real party in
interest.
The district court also granted
summary judgment to the FSLIC,
concluding that the partnership's
suit was barred by D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 315 U.S.
447, 62 S.Ct. 676 (1942), which
precluded a party from using any
secret agreements which may misrepresent a bank's assets to banking authorities as a defense to
fulfilling a financial obligation to a
102

bank. The partnership argued that
Commerce's $200,000 initial disbursement at the closing demonstrated that the partnership had
satisfactorily complied with the
terms of their agreement with
Commerce; through this payment,
Commerce allegedly waived the
loan agreement provision requiring the partnership to give Commerce a first priority lien in the
motel units. The lower court allowed the FSLIC to invoke
D'Oench as a defense to admission
of any side agreement between the
partnership and Commerce which
might alter the terms of the original
loan agreement. Subsequently, the
court found that even if Commerce
waived the priority condition in
the loan agreement, Commerce's
records did not reflect the waiver,
nor did the FSLIC demonstrate
that it knew of Commerce's waiver. Because an unwritten waiver
would deceive banking authorities,
the district court held that D'Oench
was a complete defense to the
partnership's breach of contract
claim.
The Sixth Circuit Affirms
The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit first addressed
whether Security Trust was properly dismissed as a defendant. The
partnership argued that because it
did not agree to release Security
Trust from liability, Security Trust
could not assign this liability to the
FSLIC. The court found that the
FSLIC acted within its statutory
authority under § 1729(f)(2)(A) in
assuming liability from the partnership's lawsuit. 12 U.S.C. §
1729(f)(2)(A) (1989). In addition,
the acquisition agreement provided that Security Trust would acquire "substantially all" of Commerce's assets and liabilities, thus
permitting Security Trust to select
which assets and liabilities it would
acquire. Therefore, the court of
appeals held that the district court
properly dismissed Security Trust
as a defendant.
The Sixth Circuit then considered whether the district court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the FSLIC. The
D'Oench doctrine protected the
FDIC and the FSLIC from misrep-

resentations regarding the assets of
federally insured banks by excluding any evidence of secret agreements that tend to deceive banking
authorities. The court noted that
the D'Oench doctrine had been
only partially codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e) (1989). According to the
court, section 1823(e) provided
that "no agreement that tends to
diminish the FDIC's interest in an
asset acquired from an insolvent
bank is valid unless the agreement
is in writing, was executed by the
bank and the obligor, was approved by the bank's board of
directors, and has been made a part
of the bank's official records."
Hall, 920 F.2d at 338.
The partnership claimed that
the language of § 1823(e) restricted
the D'Oench doctrine to cases
where the FDIC or the FSLIC had
acquired an interest in an asset.
The partnership argued, because
they paid back the $200,000 initial
disbursement before Commerce
fell into receivership, Commerce
did not own any "asset" when the
FSLIC assumed Commerce's assets and liabilities; thus, the doctrine did not apply to the partnership's claim.
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, noting that the D'Oench doctrine was
broader than § 1823(e). The court
admitted that in most of the cases
applying the D'Oench doctrine, the
FDIC did have an interest in an
asset because the FDIC was attempting to collect on a note it had
acquired. In addition, the court
stated that the D'Oench doctrine
was designed to allow banking authorities to determine the specific
value of bank assets and liabilities;
to further its purpose, the doctrine
applied even if the FDIC did not
have an interest in an asset.
The court, however, found that
Commerce did have an interest in
an asset. Although the partnership
paid off the $200,000 obligation,
this amount represented only a
fraction of the total amount of the
loan agreement. The court determined that when the FSLIC was
appointed receiver of Commerce,
the FSLIC gained an interest in all
of Commerce's outstanding obligations, including the partnership's
outstanding loan agreement. Both
the partnership and Commerce
Volume 3 Number 3/Spring, 1991

Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
possessed a continuing interest in
the entire amount of the loan
agreement. The court noted that in
the absence of such a continuing
interest, the partnership would not
have a valid contract claim. The
FSLIC, therefore, had standing to
assert the D'Oench defense.
Finally, the court concluded that
the D'Oench doctrine also applied
in suits brought by and against the
FSLIC. The court noted that if the
doctrine did not apply, a borrower
could circumvent the policy behind the doctrine by asserting the
claim as a counterclaim rather than
as an affirmative defense. In the
present case, the loan agreement
did not incorporate a release by
UAB of its priority or evidence of a
formal participation agreement between UAB and Commerce. The
court held that because the partnership's breach of contract action
depended on a side agreement not
included in the written agreement
between the parties, the action
must be dismissed.
Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Jones claimed that the D'Oench
doctrine applied only if the FDIC
or the FSLIC acquired an interest
in an asset from a failed bank.
Because the partnership had repaid
the $200,000 initial disbursement,
Judge Jones asserted that the FDIC
did not acquire an interest in an
asset. Therefore, he concluded that
the FSLIC could not use the
D'Oench doctrine to bar the partnership's suit.
Suzi Guemmer

Federal Bankruptcy
Code Does Not Preempt
State and Local Utility
Termination Procedures
In Robinson v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 579
(6th Cir. 1990), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state or
local laws governing utility termination procedures. Further, the
court held that Michigan law
barred a claim of liability for utility
Volume 3 Number 3/Spring, 1991

termination against the bankruptcy trustee because the trustee had
acted pursuant to a court order.
Background
Five tenants (the "tenants") resided in an apartment building in
Detroit managed by Woodward
East Management and Rental
Company ("Woodward"). As a result of Woodward's failure to pay
its gas bills, Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. ("MichCon"), discontinued gas service to the building's
heating facility and, with other
creditors, then filed a Chapter 7
involuntary bankruptcy petition
against Woodward.
The bankruptcy court appointed
David Allard ("Allard") as interim
trustee to operate Woodward's
business and directed the tenants
to pay their rent to him. The court
ordered Allard to arrange with
MichCon for gas service to the
building's heating facility and to
pay for the service from the building's rental income. The order entitled MichCon to terminate service
for nonpayment after a five day
notice to the court and interested
parties. Six months later, MichCon
filed notice that it would terminate
service to the building, as Allard
was delinquent in his payments to
MichCon; MichCon then in fact
discontinued service. MichCon
had not notified any of the tenants
prior to the termination, although
it served notice on Woodward and
its creditors.
The tenants then filed a complaint in Wayne County Circuit
Court against Allard and MichCon, alleging violations of state
and local law governing termination of utility service. Specifically,
the tenants first alleged that MichCon discontinued service without
providing proper notice as required by the Detroit Code. Detroit Code §§ 56-4-1-56-4-35. In
addition, the tenants asserted that
Allard was responsible for the termination, and by failing to pay for
the gas he violated city and state
laws. The tenants asked the court
to order Allard to provide heat and
hot water and to pay future gas
bills. Further, the tenants sought
an injunction requiring MichCon
to restore gas service for heat and

hot water and preventing MichCon
from terminating service, except as
provided under the city ordinance.
The circuit court refused to act on
the case while it was pending in the
bankruptcy court.
Allard and MichCon removed
the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan and moved for summary judgment. The tenants
moved to amend their complaint
in order to assert additional state
and municipal claims against Allard and also to remand. The district court granted Allard and
MichCon their motions for summary judgment and deemed moot
the tenants' motions to remand
and to amend. The tenants appealed.
Sixth Circuit Opinion
After finding that the district
court had proper jurisdiction in
this case, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the law of preemption. In
granting summary judgment for
MichCon, the district court had
held that the utility termination
provisions of the federal bankruptcy statute, 11 U.S.C. § 366(b)
(1989), preempted the Detroit
Code provisions, Detroit Code §§
56-4-21-56-4-35, because the local
procedures frustrated the effectiveness of the federal bankruptcy law.
First, MichCon contended that the
federal law explicitly preempted
state and local laws. Second, even
in the absence of express preemption, MichCon asserted, the federal
law implicitly preempted the state
and local laws because the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over debtors' property under the
jurisdiction statute of the Bankruptcy Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1334
(1989).
The Sixth Circuit, however,
found neither argument persuasive. The court found that a federal
law would preempt a state law
under certain circumstances which
included those where there was a
clear expression of congressional
intent to preempt state law or an
actual conflict between federal and
state law.
The Detroit Code directed a
utility not only to notify tenants of
a proposed discontinuation of ser(continued on page 104)
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